Middle East Conflict | Gaza War: "A Historic Turning Point"
In your latest book, you place the October 7 Hamas attack and its aftermath in a broader historical context. How do you assess the long-term consequences for Gaza and the future of Israel and Palestine?
The Hamas operation on October 7, with all the atrocities committed that day, was, according to its organizers, a first step toward the liberation of the Palestinians. By that measure, it ended in disaster. The Palestinian population is now under greater threat than ever before. We are witnessing a genocidal war waged by Israel, which has already claimed an enormous number of lives. The official figures for those killed directly by bombs are known. But if one also includes the deaths resulting from the blockade, the halting of humanitarian aid, the deliberate famine, the loss of water supplies, and the destruction of health infrastructure, the true number is far higher than the officially stated 60,000. We may have to assume more than 200,000. That is a horrifying tally. This was followed by a comprehensive Israeli offensive that would have been politically unfeasible without the pretext of October 7.
You speak of pretexts. For what?
A far-right government—the most extreme in Israel's history—used the attack as a pretext to reoccupy the Gaza Strip. All current members of the government had opposed Israel's withdrawal from Gaza in 2005. Netanyahu resigned from the government at the time in protest over the withdrawal (he was finance minister at the time , ed. ). Now he is using the opportunity not only to invade again, but also to expel the population. The Palestinians are being pushed into a corner of the Gaza Strip. We are seeing a clear ethnic cleansing of large parts of Gaza. The next step will likely be the organized migration of Gaza's residents. At the same time, the Israeli government is giving settlers in the West Bank—backed by the army—free rein to attack the local population. We are now witnessing ethnic cleansing in the West Bank as well. The Palestinians are in the worst situation they have been in for a long time.
Does this mean that Hamas consciously accepted – or underestimated – the foreseeable consequences of its attack?
Hamas likely considered the Israeli government weakened by the mass protests against Netanyahu and relied on Iranian support. It expected its attack to trigger a Palestinian uprising and a regional war involving Hezbollah, Syria, and Iran. But this was a complete miscalculation: instead of dividing Israeli society, the attack united it around the goal of crushing Hamas. As a result, the vast majority of Jewish Israelis supported the war and the renewed occupation of Gaza. Polls now show that many even support the expulsion of the population of the Gaza Strip—if not even of the Palestinians from Palestine. To claim that the Hamas attack has brought the Palestinian issue back onto the agenda is absurd. It is back on the agenda, yes, but not to strengthen Palestinian rights, but to find ways to finally crush the Palestinian cause. This is not progress, but a massive regression, a serious defeat. Israel is stronger today than ever before – with growing regional influence and full US backing, which has increased under both Biden and Trump.
In your book, you describe the most extremist ministers in the current Israeli government as neo-Nazis. How do you come to this conclusion?
Netanyahu and his Likud party are all right-wing extremists, while Itamar Ben Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich belong to the ultra-right faction. Holocaust historian Daniel Blatman described the latter as neo-Nazis in the newspaper Haaretz even before October 7. While there are differences in the degree of radicalism, they all share one goal: the expulsion of the Palestinians and an Israel that is "Palestinian-free" or "Arab-free." Ben Gvir and Smotrich openly describe Palestinians as "subhumans." They publicly demand their expulsion—the equivalent of a "Jew-free" territory: a Land of Israel without Palestinians. They openly espouse racist positions and believe in violence—in power politics, in pursuing their goals by any means necessary. It is deeply shocking that precisely those who invoke the legacy of the Holocaust victims are now pursuing a dream that resembles the Nazi vision of a "Jew-free" Germany. In Germany, liberals and leftists quite naturally label the AfD, or formerly the NPD, as neo-Nazis. The FPÖ in Austria is often categorized in this way as well. Compared to Ben Gvir and Smotrich, these groups seem downright moderate.
You write that, given Israel's military superiority, the only sensible path for the Palestinians is massive non-violent resistance, as in the First Intifada of 1987. Why did this strategy not lead to lasting success for the Palestinians and the realization of their rights or the end of the occupation?
The First Intifada failed, firstly, due to intense Israeli repression. Secondly—and this was more devastating—the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) hijacked the Intifada and assumed leadership. Its leader, Yasser Arafat, directed it toward his own goal of a so-called Palestinian state, which led to the Oslo Accords in the 1990s. A turning point was the transfer of power from local leaders in the occupied territories to the PLO leadership in Tunis. From there, the PLO issued official statements on behalf of the Intifada, effectively eliminating the grassroots leadership. This was a major setback for the movement's autonomy. Faced with a militarily superior enemy willing to kill, armed resistance is not in the insurgents' interest—especially when their enemy enjoys the support of the majority of the population due to the expulsion of their own people. Peaceful popular resistance, on the other hand, provides moral superiority and broader support. A mass uprising doesn't occur all at once, but in waves. Each wave strengthens the movement and gradually weakens the enemy. If the enemy responds with massacres of peaceful demonstrators, it loses international legitimacy. Israel, in particular, is dependent on Western political, diplomatic, and public support.
Can you give some examples?
To draw a comparison: In South Africa, Black people were the majority, so armed struggle against apartheid made strategic sense. In the United States, however, where Black people are a minority, violence had no chance of success. The civil rights movement, with figures like Martin Luther King Jr., achieved more through nonviolent mass resistance than armed groups like the Black Panthers. Armed resistance was a mistake, as a weaker opponent only provided a justification for brutal countermeasures that claimed more victims than peaceful protest.
You also write in your book that Palestinian freedom requires the inclusion of Israelis and a transformation of Israeli society, especially its right wing. What do you mean by that?
It sounds utopian today, but one must consider the historical perspective: After the First Intifada, public opinion in Israel shifted. Many wanted peace and an agreement with the Palestinians. That was the time of the Oslo Accords. Back then, a different mood prevailed in Israeli society. Among Jewish intellectuals, there was a post-Zionist movement that wanted to overcome Zionism and achieve peaceful coexistence. This reversed itself in 2000, when Ariel Sharon—then Israel's most right-wing politician—visited the Temple Mount to provoke. This triggered the Second Intifada. Palestinian security forces used weapons against Israeli troops whose possession Israel had deliberately permitted. Sharon used this trap as a campaign issue and won the election in 2001. He resumed his occupation of the West Bank and sparked war in the occupied territories in 2002.
The war under Sharon was very brutal, but the current violence exceeds that of that time. Therefore, I emphasize: The oppressed need a clear strategic vision. They should choose methods that fit their goals, not those that end in catastrophe.
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