What if the new right takes power in Europe?

If parties like Farage's Reform , Marine Le Pen's Rassemblement National , the AfD in Germany, and Giorgia Meloni's government in Italy, among others, simultaneously assume power, Europe will enter a phase of historic rupture with the liberal-progressive consensus that has dominated the continent since the post-war period, particularly since the 1980s and, above all, since the Maastricht Treaty. This scenario would represent a profound upheaval in the European project as we know it. The dominant model of supranational integration, unrestricted mobility, economic liberalism, and progressive cultural hegemony would be radically rejected.

This rise to power would also be the ultimate test of this anti-system protest, which we can define as the political right becoming autonomous from the traditional right of the system. These parties began with single-digit vote margins, then moved to double-digit numbers, and are expected to become the most voted political forces. However, they remain blocked until they achieve absolute majorities. They are on the rise thanks to a discourse of rupture that inevitably clashes with national and European institutions structured to prevent such change. One need only recall the European Commission's recent confrontations with Hungary and Poland, where funding cuts and lawsuits for violations of the rule of law were implemented, to understand the extent to which Brussels possesses effective instruments of pressure on sovereignist governments. Constitutional courts, councils of state, administrative, media, and financial elites, deeply aligned with liberal-progressive orthodoxy, will attempt to impose clear limits on the actions of these governments.

The Italian case illustrates this risk well: Giorgia Meloni saw the markets react immediately to her election, forcing her to moderate part of her budgetary and fiscal agenda. In the eurozone, the European Central Bank and the markets will react immediately against budgetary and fiscal policies that run counter to what we might call the European liberal consensus. Even outside the eurozone, as in the British case, the financial and diplomatic constraints could be significant and have unpredictable outcomes.

Furthermore, the electorates that elect these parties simultaneously demand greater sovereignty, greater economic protection, and less immigration—three dimensions that are difficult to reconcile. Thus, even with significant electoral victories, the real battle will be institutional. Will these governments be able to govern against the web of constraints created by the European model of recent decades? It will be a tug-of-war in which any concession will be considered a defeat.

If France, the United Kingdom, Germany, and Italy are governed by sovereigntist parties, the European Union itself will face a moment of functional collapse, but it will also face the challenge of a profound overhaul. The current Paris-Berlin axis, which sustains the balance of power, would cease to exist as we know it. We could witness several possible outcomes. The first would be an internal reconfiguration of the EU, with national sovereignty gaining primacy, repatriating powers, strengthening border controls, and revising treaties. The second would be a scenario of chronic institutional deadlock, with sovereigntist countries in permanent conflict with Brussels, unable to reach decisive consensus. The third, more radical, would be accelerated fragmentation, in which a group of countries could leave the EU or create an alternative bloc, establishing a kind of two-speed Europe: a progressive and federalist hard core and a sovereigntist alliance committed to recovering national powers.

The sovereignist priority would be realized along decisive lines. Border and immigration control would be central. Free movement within Europe would be limited, and in countries like France, restrictive migration policies would be implemented, reversing decades of openness. Illegal flows would drop significantly, but confrontation with NGOs, European courts, and human rights organizations would become permanent. We would also witness the rise of protectionist economies. The logic of the single market would be replaced by pragmatic economic nationalism, with each country recovering fiscal and monetary instruments whenever possible, prioritizing national companies, strategic industries, and local production chains. The post-Maastricht period would bring state subsidies, selective trade barriers, and internal reindustrialization.

There would also be a genuine cultural and axiological revolution in educational programs, the media, and cultural institutions. Sovereignist governments would fund national identity institutes and implement educational policies centered on each nation's history, values, and culture. The battle against identity-based agendas, DEI policies, and woke ideology would reach a new level, creating a cultural counter-hegemony. A profound reform of the state and judicial systems would follow, reconfiguring regulatory bodies and directly confronting the administrative elite that governed by inertia. This institutional deprogression would generate strong reactions: massive protests, strikes, and international campaigns to delegitimize them.

This political shift would also have a huge impact on the global geopolitical landscape. The relationship with the United States would be profoundly altered, as a sovereignist Europe would seek to reduce its strategic dependence on Washington, reconfiguring NATO and introducing internal tensions, especially in Germany and France. Foreign policy toward Russia would also change: parties like the RN and AfD would advocate a more pragmatic stance, which could weaken the Atlantic front and reopen diplomatic channels. As for China, a sovereignist Europe would likely adopt a realistic and less ideological stance, seeking strategic agreements without political subordination. This would accelerate the transition to a multipolar world order.

At this moment, Europe is primarily symbolic. Its greatest asset remains a large-scale consumer market, but the political and economic importance of the European space has diminished significantly relative to other powers and blocs. The rise of China, India, and several Asian countries, and the reassertion of the United States, demonstrate that the idea of ​​an America that, to regain its greatness, realizes it must turn inward and rebuild its internal strength to regain global hegemony, now seems unattainable.

A point as decisive, if not more so, than the economic one is institutional, cultural, and axiological. Even if sovereignists gain power, the progressive establishment will not disappear. It controls universities, media outlets, social networks, NGOs, international organizations, courts, and much of the European bureaucracy. It is highly likely that permanent campaigns of delegitimization will emerge, along with social instability manufactured through instrumentalized street movements, legal wars, and intense diplomatic pressure. Governing against this machine will require these parties to demonstrate a strategic and narrative cohesion that they are still far from demonstrating.

We will now have two Europes in conflict: a sovereignist, more realistic Europe, focused on defending national identities, border control, and the primacy of internal democracy; and a globalist-progressive Europe, composed of Brussels and fiercely resisting fragmentation. The outcome will depend on the ability of these governments to articulate a common vision and resist internal and external sabotage. For this change to succeed, and pending the desirable end of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, a long-term strategy will be necessary, cohesion among sovereignist governments, the training of competent personnel, and, above all, the ability to create a new civilizational narrative that resists the media and cultural pressure of the system.

Otherwise, the risk is clear: after a brief cycle of governance, progressivism could return more centralizing, more authoritarian, and more intrusive than ever. If they fail, they risk being merely a turbulent interlude; if they succeed, we could witness the birth of a new Europe of nations. For the first time since the fall of the Berlin Wall, the continent's future is no longer written.