Dollar in the spotlight: The 5 cards the government can play to reach the legislative elections without any problems.

There are 15 exchange rate days remaining until the October 26 elections, which will be ordered by Congress and, with it, the viability of the reform plan. After the setback in Buenos Aires and the volatility of September, the ruling party is seeking to keep the dollar within its ranges as a sign of control and credibility. Memories of 2018–2019 hover over the market, although the political picture is not one of a change of government already discounted.

In this context, the wholesale dollar is hovering around $1,424.50, approximately 4% below the intervention ceiling. Recent weeks have seen BCRA sales of more than USD 1.1 billion, agricultural income under zero withholdings until the USD 7 billion quota is exhausted, and the announcement of support from the U.S.

The government combined pragmatism and improvisation: an agreement with the IMF for USD 20 billion, two placements of the Bond 2030 bonds (USD 1 billion), and, when the dollar hit the threshold, official sales. The "silver bullet" was twofold: political and financial support from Washington and a temporary removal of withholding taxes to accelerate settlements. This flattened the rise, but required sales and reduced the margin for rebuilding reserves.

1) External signal and timing: Caputo-Bessent meeting. The key is to transform political support into concrete flow. Any announcement after the meeting in Washington (liquidity lines, guarantees, or disbursement schedule) could anchor expectations from Monday the 6th and widen the defensive cushion near the ceiling of the bands.

2) The Treasury's "wall" in cash. With more than USD 2 billion absorbed from exporters, the Treasury can offer dollars directly on the market to deflate peak demand. The tactic: ration sales to set prices, avoid gaps, and stretch ammunition until October 26.

3) Defense in the upper range. If the exchange rate breaks below $1.482, the Central Bank is authorized to sell without sterilizing. This is a rapid brake, at the expense of net reserves. The key is to calibrate interventions: strong enough to stem intraday runs, but not so large as to deplete the reserves.

4) Derivatives and "safe dollar" to absorb pesos. The Central Bank stocked up on dollar-linked bonds (~$7 billion nominal). By selling them, it provides currency coverage to private individuals, absorbs pesos, and reduces pressure on the MULC without releasing reserves. It also leverages futures positions to mitigate devaluation expectations.

5) Multilaterals as a safety net. Advances from the World Bank and IDB (announced for approximately USD 7.9 billion over the next 15 months) strengthen gross reserves and the bridge financing strategy. Their effectiveness depends on guarantees and political backing from the US/IMF.

Operators assume that any profound redefinition of the regime (freer floating and reserve buybacks) will be postponed until after October. Until then, the "microsurgery" will consist of measured sales, managing expectations, and surgically using derivatives. The other risk is concentrated import demand, which accelerates the use of foreign currency and requires more interventions.

The IMF reaffirmed its focus: accumulating reserves, maintaining a firm fiscal anchor, and broad political support to sustain disinflation. The ruling party is banking on a result that improves its governability, reducing the risk premium on the peso-denominated curve, easing interest rates, and loosening the pre-election defensive dollarization.

• Wholesale dollar fluctuating within the band with occasional interventions.
• Moderate volume (without peaks of USD 900 M) and lower import “tail”.
• Reserves stabilized by multilateral/treasury institutions and lower net sacrifice by the Central Bank.
• Peso curve with smooth rates and better rollover.
• Official communication aligned: “no new restrictions” and “no discretionary leaps.”

The manual for the next three weeks is one of fine management: more scalpel than axe. If the policy is sound and the ammunition is sufficient, the government can take office with the dollar contained. The day after will depend, as always, on parliamentary arithmetic and the scope to redesign the exchange rate regime without rekindling expectations.