Social turbulence

Finally, immigration has erupted. The conflicts in Torre Pacheco and other municipalities have shown that one part of the country is no different from that of certain Europeans. And it couldn't be otherwise, for at least two reasons. First, a layer of structural racism: like other colonizing countries, Spain is no stranger to the view of the colonized as inferior. And that conception persists. Second, a marked asymmetry between macroeconomic benefits and individual costs. Let's take it step by step.

President Sánchez is right to assert that immigration accounts for a significant portion of growth. The evidence is overwhelming: between 2018 and 2024, 72% of the jobs created (2.3 million) were taken up by foreign-born individuals, while in Catalonia it is approaching 100% of the more than 450,000 new jobs, which, when translated into GDP growth, points to a minimum contribution of 35% to 45%. We could continue to mention its weight in employment (30% in Catalonia), its decisive contribution to certain sectors (primary, food industry, commerce, hospitality, transport, etc.), or its share in the growth of public revenue.

Without a good provision of public services, conflicts with immigration emerge

But the fact that they are decisive in the growth of GDP and other macroeconomic indicators is only part of the country's balance with immigration. Another, very relevant to the conflict that is beginning to emerge, is the loss of well-being of those negatively affected by the effects of immigration on rents, education, healthcare, or social assistance. Because their territorial concentration is much more significant than averages suggest: in 2024, compared to 24% of immigrants in the Catalan population, their weight spills over into smaller territorial areas where the individual costs are more noticeable. These are the cases of Barcelona (32% of residents), Alt Empordà (31%), or, above average, those of Segarra, Baix Empordà, Gironès, Tarragonès, and La Garrotxa; or, in an urban setting, those of Lloret de Mar (45% of residents) or Salt (44%) and very high values in Hospitalet (38%), Figueres and Roses (36%), Barcelona (33%), Olot (32%) and Santa Coloma de Gramenet (30%), among other municipalities. And, as Princeton professor Rafaela Dancynger shows ( Immigration and Conflict in Europe , 2010), experience suggests that conflicts with immigration emerge when the supply of public goods is not adequate: inevitably, it generates competition between natives and immigrants and with it arises the potential for conflict.

Underlying racism and insufficient public services are two reasons for the conflict that is beginning to emerge. Regarding social values, there is little we can do in the short term. But we can act on the provision of public services, although there is not much time left: if we don't act quickly and decisively today, we will cry tomorrow.