After the yes vote for the grand coalition: How the SPD is fighting for political survival – and why Pistorius is left out

When Lars Klingbeil seized several centers of power after his party's election debacle—the SPD chairmanship, parliamentary group leadership, and command of the coalition negotiations—one thing became abundantly clear: the Social Democrats aren't seeking renewal, they're seeking proximity to power. And they're doing it in the person of Klingbeil, of all people.

The fact that Boris Pistorius, the most popular SPD politician in the country, will not become Vice Chancellor reveals more than just internal party rankings. It exposes the tactical calculations of the new red-black coalition of convenience. For the SPD, the upcoming coalition government will be a balancing act: between a loss of profile and personnel infighting—just think of the renewed debate surrounding Saskia Esken.

The membership vote with which the SPD leadership is now entering the coalition therefore reveals itself, upon closer inspection, to be weakly legitimate. Just 54 percent of the party base participated in the survey – despite the convenient online voting. A resounding slap in the face. For the leaders. For outgoing Chancellor Olaf Scholz . And for the smug gesture of a 16 percent party that acted in the coalition talks as if it had won the election.

The narrow result is therefore more of a warning than a mandate. The message from the grassroots: "We will follow – but not unconditionally." For many comrades, the approval was less a matter of conviction than of fear of new elections or political insignificance.

And so, starting May 6, when Friedrich Merz is elected chancellor, the SPD's fight for political survival will begin. The grand coalition may be starting with a serious handicap for the Social Democrats. Power is close at hand. But the future remains distant. An analysis.

From next week, a coalition of control will govern

What is being sold in party offices as a "coalition of reason" is in reality a coalition of control. Chancellor Friedrich Merz wanted no experiments, no traffic light excesses, no green vocabulary. And no coalition of equals either. The CDU holds the Chancellery, the Interior Ministry, the Economic Affairs Ministry , and the Foreign Office—and thus the strategic backbone of the government. The SPD exerts its strength primarily through the Finance Ministry, presumably in the person of Lars Klingbeil—and through the parliamentary group leadership.

The CDU is therefore back in the Chancellery, but is far from on the up. Merz's government is pursuing a program of "constructive de-ideologization": less transformation, more order, economic restraint instead of investment offensives. His plan: to regain the political center with clear communication and conservative reliability, while the SPD is busy working on domestic policy. The prospects for the party are therefore anything but rosy.

SPD: Social policy under strict supervision

The Social Democrats, for their part, had to learn that they can govern under Merz—but they can't shape things as they please. While the coalition agreement contains social promises— a minimum wage of €15 —everything is subject to budgetary constraints. With Klingbeil as finance minister, the SPD has leverage, but little room for maneuver, despite the €500 billion special fund for infrastructure, a gift from the CDU/CSU to the SPD.

And so there will be some sticking points in the coming legislative period. The SPD wants to win back its voters with social policy. But every new cent has to be justified in the cabinet. The CDU appears willing to compromise, as long as it doesn't involve tax increases or new debt.

Things aren't looking good for the SPD when it comes to migration policy either. The new Interior Minister, Alexander Dobrindt, specifically appointed as a hardliner from the CSU, is pushing for deportations and safe third-country regulations. In return, the SPD gets integration programs without financial security. It's a classic trade-off, but an issue that stirs emotions among the SPD's base.

The sticking point is the economy: While the CDU relies on market-based instruments, the SPD fails to provide a green corrective. The result: climate policy ambitions are declining, and the coal phase-out is de facto postponed. The Social Democrats risk another loss of legitimacy among young voters.

Why Klingbeil and not Pistorius Vice-Chancellor: A mistake!

Particularly striking is the fact that Boris Pistorius was left out of the running for the party's powerhouse position, where he is excluded, although he will likely remain Defense Minister. Despite strong support among the grassroots and support within parts of the party, the decision was made against him. Is this a signal from the leadership, or further proof of the extent to which internal power struggles determine events? Boris Pistorius was and remains popular, inclusive, and assertive as Defense Minister. The 65-year-old was considered the SPD's brightest hope. But that was precisely what proved to be his downfall.

In a coalition designed for balance and discipline, the man from Lower Saxony seemed too autonomous, too independent. He was a power factor outside the Klingbeil camp, who is now the big boss of his comrades. But it wasn't just this camp that had to keep him in check; Chancellor Merz probably also saw a Vice Chancellor Pistorius as a strategic risk: a man with his own profile who, if necessary, could compete for stability in the center. Instead, they opted for a familiar duo: Klingbeil, predictable and reliable, takes on the role of social democratic regulator. The SPD is thus concentrating power in the leadership – but is losing breadth. Saskia Esken appears to be left completely out of the running; the party leader is on the verge of being ousted. Many in the party no longer want her. And yet she and her co-leader Klingbeil are responsible for the poor election result.

The CDU: After the Chancellor election, it is the boss in the ring

The CDU under Merz is not just the chancellor's party, it is the defining force of the government. The party sets the tone and pace. The fact that it allows the SPD room for some social policy initiatives is not an expression of generosity, but of strategic prudence: Merz knows that the SPD must be useful for his government's ability to command a majority – but not strong. His goal: to politically starve the SPD without offending it. If the future chancellor succeeds in this balancing act, he could manage without it in 2029 – with a more conservative coalition, perhaps with a returning FDP (no longer in the Bundestag after the election) or perhaps with the Greens, who have portrayed themselves for months as a much better coalition partner for the CDU/CSU.

A temporary coalition: CDU governs, the SPD compensates

The coalition between the CDU and SPD is an alliance that arose not from common ground, but from a lack of alternatives. Both sides repeatedly say this. The CDU governs, the SPD compensates – for social balance, not out of conviction. For the Social Democrats, it's a risky ride: either they profile themselves as guarantors of social stability, or they will ultimately lose face in the embrace of the center. For Chancellor Merz, the situation is easier: He can moderate, steer, rein in – and ultimately say he's delivered. For the SPD, however, every step becomes a balancing act.