To populists of all parties

Nine months after arriving at the Hôtel Matignon, French Prime Minister François Bayrou acknowledged that only unpopular measures can reduce public spending, lower the deficit, and lower government debt. And no, Bayrou is not a monster. On the contrary, he is a proven moderate, an experienced, cautious politician, aware of the balance required for negotiation, and an expert in the rules of the French corridors of power. He met with Balladur, Chirac, Juppé, and Edouard Philippe. He was one of Macron's earliest supporters. A true political survivor whose career could end tomorrow, taking the French president with him, if the government's motion of confidence fails in parliament. Bayrou is neither a novice nor a populist, but he recognized the obvious: France must reduce public debt if it wants to innovate and avoid gradual impoverishment, enter the 21st century, and avoid a moment (increasingly approaching) when the end of social benefits will be dictated by a social upheaval that will achieve with violence what politicians cannot achieve through negotiation. That, or end an authoritarian government that guarantees security and peace to the majority of the population, even at the cost of widespread impoverishment.

One of the many damages that António Costa's governments inflicted on the country was an unusual increase in the number of civil servants, without a corresponding improvement in public services. From 656,000 in 2014, the number of civil servants reached 742,000 in 2022. A new high was reached in May under the AD government, but the Office for the Prevention and Investigation of Aircraft and Railway Accidents continued to have only one specialized inspector . There are civil servants where they shouldn't be, and none where they are needed. The impact of this disorganization on public finances is not difficult to imagine. Yes, it's true that António Costa's last governments achieved budget surpluses and that public debt (relative to GDP) fell. But this was at the expense of public service cuts (one of the reasons they worsened) and low interest rates, as inflationary pressure was low at the time. Were it not for the increase in the number of civil servants and the disorganization of the State, budget surpluses would be greater, and the retentions would be smaller or even non-existent. But the random hiring of civil servants occurred because they are an easy constituency for governments. At the time, for the Socialist Party; now for the Democratic Party, which strives to win them over; in time, another source of growth for Chega. A more cynical analyst, commentator, or even politician will say it's pragmatism; another, more realistic, that it's nothing more than populism. Not the histrionic populism that leaps out at you, but something more subtle, ingenious, pompous, and meek, yet equally penetrating and destructive.

France has a public debt that prevents it from innovating, and Portugal has an excess of civil servants that renders a worthy state reform futile. If the digitization of state services makes many of the jobs performed by civil servants redundant, a state reform will only be complete if the government determines what to do with these employees who will no longer have anything to do. Will it mobilize them for other roles? Will it force the older ones into retirement? Or will it resort to dismissal? Raising these questions is neither populism nor ignorance. It's a willingness to deal with the facts. Doing what most politicians (government and opposition) have been unwilling to do for decades because they want to win elections regardless of the cost of their inaction to the country and its people. That subtle, pompous, ingenious, and meek populism, but as pervasive and destructive as that of those who shout.

François Bayrou's proposal is not popular. Unfortunately, it is necessary. The Liberal Initiative's proposal to reduce the number of civil servants doesn't please the majority. But it is inevitable, otherwise, within a few years, we will have thousands of people sitting in public departments and offices with nothing to do. It is true that in Portugal, the percentage of civil servants relative to the employed population is lower than in Sweden and Denmark. But also lower than in France. And if there is one thing Sweden did in the 1990s, it was reform the state and the economy. It changed the tax system and collective wage bargaining, placed a cap on public spending, reduced the state-owned business sector, and brought wages and productivity closer together. In short, these are reforms that Portugal has been avoiding for years, so it is amusing that, here, states that have implemented reforms are used as a pretext for not implementing them.

We can overlook debt or the excessive burden of the State, which reduces the scope for investment and improving living conditions. But debt, especially public debt, was one of the greatest drivers of the most destructive revolutions. And if there's one lesson France will remember (because it's already experienced this many times), it's that it's better to act and reform while there's still time than to do so through abrupt changes or cosmetic tricks that guarantee security as compensation for impoverishment. If there's one lesson we can remember in Portugal (because we've already experienced this many times), it's that we'd all benefit if we looked at problems seriously and truthfully, rather than in the pompous way that serves only to disguise worn-out artifices.

One final note regarding the possibility of the French government falling and a budget not being approved for 2026: Germany is the only state that can bail out France in the event of a French default. But Germany (like all of Europe) has more to spend money on, particularly defense. 2026 is not 2011. The available resources are fewer, and external threats are greater. The German chancellor himself, with his characteristic directness, warned young people not to rely on the public pension system. This is a warning to France, but also to Portugal, whose public debt was reduced relative to GDP, largely because GDP grew. In the event of a recession, the debt-to-GDP ratio rises, and the gains achieved vanish overnight. The margin is slim, which is why it is urgent to consider state reform in a serious and sustained manner, not as something cool and sexy like putting documents in a cloud .