The firearm

The massive rural fires are back, and with them, the endless diatribes from the government, the opposition, local authorities, generalists, experts, and columnists, from those who think they know and also from those who don't, but have nothing else to do.
Without respecting chronologies or claiming to be exhaustive, I recall Eduardo Cabrita accusing Maria Lúcia Amaral of not understanding the importance of airplanes, António Nunes emphasizing that firefighters should lead operations, Mariana Leitão criticizing the disorganization of fire-fighting resources, Tiago Oliveira recommending responsible behavior from the public, André Ventura railing against arsonists, José Miguel Cardoso Pereira analyzing the progress made in recent years in firefighting, António José Seguro calling for a generational pact, Luís Montenegro recalling the finiteness of fire-fighting resources, Henrique Pereira dos Santos pointing to the lack of forest management, José Luís Carneiro congratulating himself on the government following his party's recommendations, the smart guys from Marinhais anticipating the fireworks display to circumvent the alert that was about to come into effect, and Ricardo Trigo explaining the extreme weather conditions that have been affecting the country.
The diversity of opinions and the multiplicity of topics debated require the adoption of a rationale, that is, a framework to guide reasoning. I propose a simple methodology in which a large rural fire is compared to the effects of a gunshot—a "firearm," so to speak. Now, for a gunshot to occur, there must be a pulled trigger, good-quality gunpowder, a bullet capable of causing damage, and, last but not least, an appropriate weapon.
In the proposed conceptual framework, all discussion about the hierarchy, competence, and organization of combat forces, as well as the strategy implemented and the sufficiency and adequacy of resources, concerns only mitigating the effects of the "firearm" discharge, not the discharge itself. These are, of course, very important aspects that cannot be ignored whenever a discharge occurs, but which occur subsequently. Believing that the problems arising from the discharge of a firearm can be resolved by increasing the number and operational capacity of intervention resources (after the discharge has occurred) is an obvious error that, unfortunately, many still commit.
In turn, since pulling the trigger is the immediate cause of the gunshot, it becomes important to understand whether the "firearm" was discharged due to a natural cause, such as a lightning strike associated with a dry thunderstorm, an accident attributable to human activity, such as a spark caused by a power line coming into contact with treetops, or an effect resulting from direct human action, whether negligent, such as a fire, the use of machinery, or the launching of party fireworks, or criminal. In this context, calls for the population to adopt ignition-preventative behavior, increased vigilance day and night, and the declaration of alerts for the entire territory are certainly appropriate measures, but they do not address the core issue of preventing a gunshot from having disastrous consequences, should it occur.
Then comes the aspect of gunpowder quality, which, in the case of "firearms," is directly linked to atmospheric conditions, namely high temperatures, low humidity, and strong winds, especially if combined with a long period without precipitation. Although meteorology cannot be controlled, forecast models allow us to understand, with increasing accuracy, the evolution of the weather and, thus, anticipate the "gunpowder quality." It should be noted in this regard that dry powder can also be fired, that is, without bullets in the chamber. This is what happens, for example, in the Sahara Desert where, despite the excellent pyrometeorological conditions for guaranteeing high-quality gunpowder, there is nothing to burn.
Indeed, the destructive power of a shot depends greatly on the specific characteristics of the bullet, which, for the "firearm," are determined by landscape characteristics such as topography, the layout of the vegetation mosaic, the type of vegetation and its state of stress, and, above all, the quality of management. Prescribed fire operations, land clearing, the construction of firebreaks, the introduction of goats and sheep, and awareness campaigns are some of the many actions involved in efforts to reduce the destructive power of bullets.
However, the truly crucial aspect is the very existence of the gun; indeed, without a gun, it makes no sense to talk about shots, gunpowder, or bullets, and therefore, effective control that limits the proliferation of weapons is the only truly effective way to reduce the problems arising from shootings. In the case of "firearms," this control is achieved through land use planning. However, this is a very costly measure that extends over a long period of time and whose results are not immediately perceptible, characteristics that make it difficult for today's egocentric and immediate-focused society to accept. In this sense, a potentially effective way to mobilize citizens would be to convince them that the territory is a "common part" of the country and that, as in a condominium, there are obligations toward the common parts (be it a foundation or a rooftop terrace), even if we do not directly benefit from them, since they are essential to the maintenance of the structural whole.
Clearly, a proposal of this nature raises the issue of the current existence of knowledge that would allow for efficient management of the "common areas" of the territory. Such knowledge does indeed exist, and any of us can obtain a copy of the National Plan for Integrated Rural Fire Management 20-30 based on Council of Ministers Resolution No. 45-A/2020 of June 16th. The problem, therefore, is solely one of implementation and, for this reason, is eminently political. As someone rightly stated a few days ago, "there has been progress in fighting fires, but we lack training because we have too much information." I completely agree with that statement. In large part, because I was the person who made it.
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