Do unto others as others do unto you

In recent weeks, Russia has intensified its hybrid warfare actions against several European countries. Russia's undeclared objectives are evident in the effects it causes: intimidation of European political actors, disproportionate diversion of resources to internal defense and a consequent reduction in support for Ukraine, and the promotion of narratives that undermine NATO's credibility and foster distrust among its members.

Can Russia be satisfied with the results achieved?

As is often the case in the play of shadows and light that international relations have become in our time, the answer is 'Yes and no'.

Despite some initial confusion, NATO responded by reinforcing its resources and launching an operation to patrol and protect its eastern flank. Poland, after consulting with its allies under Article 4 of the Treaty, made it clear that it would shoot down any threats that re-crossed its airspace, and Donald Trump went further, stating that all NATO countries should do the same, with Marco Rubio later adding (depending on the circumstances).

On the other hand, the announced increase in air assets seemed insufficient to many observers, who advocated for a more robust response, and excessive to others, who argued that the defense capabilities deployed were disproportionate to deal with these threats. The result was a European and Ukrainian push to produce the necessary capabilities at a scale and with a cost-effectiveness commensurate with the threat's potential.

In terms of the narratives surrounding this war, while Russia achieved a tactical gain by highlighting some of the vulnerabilities exposed by NATO countries, the unintended consequence, with potential strategic effects, was the acceleration of a set of narratives unfavorable to Russia and favorable to Ukraine.

How can some claim that the last few weeks have 'gone well' for Russia, given the hardening of the American position, including the announcement of a new arms supply agreement with Ukraine, worth 90 billion euros, and Von der Leyen's announcement of bringing forward to 2026 the end of 'direct or indirect' purchases of energy products from Russia?

Despite this positive development after the initial surprise, the truth is that European citizens and their policymakers have reason to be concerned and focused on quickly learning some lessons...

NATO, with all the strengths and capabilities of the world's largest defensive alliance, is proving too cumbersome and slow to deal with the unexpected.

On the other hand, the attack surface exposed to Russia is gigantic and diverse, from submarine cables to military bases, logistical networks, critical physical and digital infrastructure, and so on. While the efforts to make the most critical elements resilient are commendable, it will not be possible to defend everything optimally, much less against an adversary that is not interested in agreeing on the 'rules of the game'.

To overcome the dilemma of Impossible Total Defense, Europe needs to abandon its exclusively defensive posture and develop its own hybrid strategy, capable of confronting asymmetric threats without losing democratic values.

We must begin by helping European leaders escape this limitation of always playing defense, when they should be developing and utilizing their own asymmetric, hybrid action capabilities, under the cover of a strategy of calculated ambiguity at the diplomatic level, and implausible deniability at the strategic communication level, similar to what Ukraine did when it initiated actions on Russian territory.

These actions should prioritize physical, virtual, and psychological effects, while maintaining adherence to the liberal values ​​of democratic states governed by the rule of law. This means agreeing to limit European 'Hybrid Counterwar', in the short term, to offensive cyberspace operations, counter-information campaigns, electronic disruption, and psychological attacks.

Another limitation would be to ensure the democratic control that is indispensable, through post-operational review models at regular intervals.

NATO member countries must understand, given all this, that to effectively and cost-effectively deter Russia's hybrid war, they must, first and foremost, not assume that they will do to Russia what it does to them, and they must do so with the minimum coordination necessary to keep everything in the gray area between peace and war... just as the Russians do.

SEDES Security and Defense Observatory