How China’s Propaganda and Surveillance Systems Really Operate

A trove of internal documents leaked from a little-known Chinese company has pulled back the curtain on how digital censorship tools are being marketed and exported globally. Geedge Networks sells what amounts to a commercialized “Great Firewall” to at least four countries, including Kazakhstan, Pakistan, Ethiopia, and Myanmar. The groundbreaking leak shows in granular detail the capabilities this company has to monitor, intercept, and hack internet traffic. Researchers who examined the files described it as “digital authoritarianism as a service.”

But I want to focus on another thing the documents demonstrate: While people often look at China’s Great Firewall as a single, all-powerful government system unique to China, the actual process of developing and maintaining it works the same way as surveillance technology in the West. Geedge collaborates with academic institutions on research and development, adapts its business strategy to fit different clients’ needs, and even repurposes leftover infrastructure from its competitors. In Pakistan, for example, Geedge landed a contract to work with and later replace gear made by the Canadian company Sandvine, the leaked files show.

Coincidentally, another leak from a different Chinese company published this week reinforces the same point. On Monday, researchers at Vanderbilt University made public a 399-page document from GoLaxy, a Chinese company that uses AI to analyze social media and generate propaganda materials. The leaked documents, which include internal pitch decks, business goals, and meeting notes, may have come from a disgruntled former employee—the last two pages accuse GoLaxy of mistreating workers by underpaying them and mandating long hours. The document had been sitting on the open internet for months before another researcher flagged it to Brett Goldstein, a research professor in the School of Engineering at Vanderbilt.

GoLaxy’s main business is different from Geedge’s: It collects open source information from social media, maps relationships among political figures and news organizations, and pushes targeted narratives online through synthetic social media profiles. In the leaked document, GoLaxy claims to be the “number one brand in intelligence big data analysis” in China, servicing three main customers: the Chinese Communist Party, the Chinese government, and the Chinese military. The included technology demos focus heavily on geopolitical issues like Taiwan, Hong Kong, and US elections. And unlike Geedge, GoLaxy seems to be targeting only domestic government entities as clients.

But there are also quite a few things that make the two companies comparable, particularly in terms of how their businesses function. Both Geedge and GoLaxy maintain close relationships with the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS), the top government-affiliated research institution in the world, according to the Nature Index. And they both market their services to Chinese provincial-level government agencies, who have localized issues they want to monitor and budgets to spend on surveillance and propaganda tools.

GoLaxy didn’t immediately respond to a request for comment from WIRED. In a previous response to The New York Times, the company denied collecting data targeting US officials and called the outlet’s reporting misinformation. Vanderbilt researchers say they witnessed the company remove pages from its website after the initial reporting.

In the West, when academic scholars see opportunities to commercialize their cutting-edge research, they often become startup founders or start side businesses. GoLaxy seems to be no exception. Many key researchers at the company, according to the leaked document, still occupy spots at CAS.

But there’s no guarantee that CAS researchers will get government grants—just like a public university professor in the US can’t bet on their startup winning federal contracts. Instead, they need to go after government agencies like any private company would go after clients. One document in the leak shows that GoLaxy assigned sales targets to five employees and was aiming to secure 42 million RMB (about $5.9 million) in contracts with Chinese government agencies in 2020. Another spreadsheet from around 2021 lists the company’s current clients, which include branches of the Chinese military, state security, and provincial police departments, as well as other potential customers it was targeting.

Together, these two leaks show how the surveillance and propaganda industry in China is driven as much by economic forces as political ideology. “This echoes what I saw in researching emotion recognition AI and other surveillance tech, whose sales often appeared to be more motivated by market logic than by a grand plan to make the world more authoritarian,” says Shazeda Ahmed, a DataX postdoctoral scholar at UCLA.

The parallels with the West are hard to miss. A number of American surveillance and propaganda firms also started as academic projects before they were spun out into startups and grew by chasing government contracts. The difference is that in China, these companies operate with far less transparency. Their work comes to light only when a trove of documents slips onto the internet.

One of the aha moments I had reading the GoLaxy leak was when it explained the importance of its work by comparing it to Cambridge Analytica, a political consulting firm that harvested Facebook data from millions of users to target ads and influence elections.

“Internationally, besides helping Donald Trump win the 2016 US presidential election, the British company Cambridge Analytica had actually participated in more than 40 American political campaigns, and played an important behind-the-scenes role in events such as Ukraine’s Orange Revolution and the Brexit movement in the UK,” the document boasted.

An Associated Press investigation this week reveals that US companies have also allegedly participated in China’s surveillance market themselves. Over the course of decades, American firms sold software and hardware to Chinese police entities, some with features explicitly marketed for monitoring minority populations.

It is tempting to think of the Great Firewall or Chinese propaganda as the outcome of a top-down master plan that only the Chinese Communist Party could pull off. But these leaks suggest a more complicated reality. Censorship and propaganda efforts must be marketed, financed, and maintained. They are shaped by the logic of corporate quarterly financial targets and competitive bids as much as by ideology—except the customers are governments, and the products can control or shape entire societies.

This is an edition of Zeyi Yang and Louise Matsakis’ Made in China newsletter. Read previous newsletters here.