Technological revolution in warfare makes it increasingly difficult for major powers to win against smaller countries

In today's tumultuous world, it seems hard to imagine, but not so long ago, international security wasn't a topic of discussion in the Netherlands. About ten years ago, says defense researcher Tim Sweijs, he went out with an idea for a book about the future of war. Amsterdam publishers looked at him blankly.

Meanwhile, "The War of Tomorrow ," the book by Sweijs and professor of military science and former soldier Martijn Kitzen, published at the end of April, is now in its second printing. And so much has happened since then that a new, revised edition would certainly be appropriate.

In June, for example, Israel destroyed Iranian air defense systems with small drones smuggled into the country by commandos. During "Operation Spiderweb," Ukraine managed to hit military airfields and strategic bombers in Russia—using unmanned vehicles , thousands of kilometers from the front line. Inside Ukraine itself, Russian soldiers surrendered to a detachment of Ukrainian drones and tracked robots—the first time unmanned systems had taken prisoners of war.

“If you had told me this a year earlier, I would have dismissed such a scenario as pure science fiction,” says Sweijs.

In their book, Kitzen and Sweijs describe the breakneck pace at which warfare is changing, in a world where everything is interconnected and artificial intelligence is increasingly making decisions. As the lines between war and peace blur, the authors warn of the return of classic interstate conflict—including in Europe.

The fact that war could also become a reality for the Netherlands was long overlooked by the general public. Despite warning signs, such as the annexation of Crimea in 2014, the downing of flight MH17 with 196 Dutch nationals on board, and the steady Russian troop buildup on the Ukrainian border in 2021.

"Bizarre," Sweijs finds. "On talk shows, there were whole discussions about whether Putin was going to invade Ukraine or not. When David van Weel, now Minister of Justice, then a senior NATO official, said we had to prepare for war, Maarten van Rossem called him a warmonger."

After the MH17 crash, the Airmobile Brigade was ready for deployment in Ukraine, but the Rutte I cabinet backed out at the last minute. Martijn Kitzen says this was wrong: "The Netherlands could have cordoned off the crash site for the recovery of the victims and the investigation. Putin would certainly have had something to say about that, but other countries would certainly have supported us. But we didn't take any military measures."

Was that fear or naivety?

Sweijs: "Total naiveté. It didn't fit our worldview."

Kitzen: “The US, the UK or France would not have reacted as reluctantly as we did if a plane full of their citizens had been shot down.

MH17 made it clear to me that a major war in Europe was a possibility. You see how Putin operates: he takes more and more until he has everything.

What's happening in Ukraine is sometimes called "World War I with drones." Is this the war of the future, or rather the old-fashioned war with trenches?

Sweijs: "The war in Ukraine is very interesting because neither side could achieve air superiority with fighter jets—not even Russia. As a result, all land operations ground to a halt, and the front line froze. Unmanned drones were then deployed on both sides, but this is being hampered by increasingly sophisticated electronic warfare, which disrupts the drones' controls. Twentieth-century Western warfare—the deployment of firepower and maneuvering on the battlefield—is constantly evolving. That's completely different from twenty years ago."

But what Israel did in Iran is classic American "shock and awe" from the Second Gulf War of 2003. You take out the air defenses, then you can bomb whatever you want.

Kitzen: “Israel and Iran engaged in aerial warfare because the distance between the two countries was too great. But you see that Israel has crippled Iranian air defenses using various methods. They infiltrated Iran with commandos and disabled Iranian air defense systems with anti-tank missiles fired remotely via the internet. That shows how important connectivity has become: the use of communication systems and the internet. There's also a third element, which we describe as 'synthetic applications': the merging of robots and artificial intelligence. The Israelis likely used AI to detect a pattern within the leadership of the Revolutionary Guard in Iran. They influenced that pattern in such a way that the generals gathered at a place and time known to the Israelis – after which they carried out an airstrike.”

In the nineteenth century, the stronger power won nine times out of ten. After World War II, the weaker party won 55 percent of the time.

Kitzen: "War is truly innovation. Ukraine has managed to sustain this war by constantly innovating. This also applies to influencing public opinion worldwide. Ukraine released images from the battlefield very quickly – which led to increased Western support. What happens on the battlefield, you see on your phone seconds later. Israel and Ukraine also released images of secret operations via social media. Not only to impress their opponents, but also to gain supporters worldwide."

In your book, you state that it is becoming increasingly difficult for military powers to win against smaller opponents.

Sweijs: "Yes, that's supported by the data. In the nineteenth century, the stronger power won nine times out of ten. But after World War II, those ratios were reversed, and in 55 percent of cases, the weaker party won. In the 1920s, the British could easily bomb the Middle East from the air. And now just look at the problems a small power like the Houthis can cause for shipping in the Red Sea."

Kitzen: "Smaller parties have to innovate to survive. And that process is fueled by the further spread of technological resources. I read a great quote somewhere about Ukraine's Operation Spiderweb, deep inside Russia: 'An average physics class could have accomplished this.' The drones are widely available. They were simply controlled via the 4G network. We'll have to learn to deal with that situation in the coming years."

Why then does the world seem to be returning to large-scale conflict, when there is no way to win?

Sweijs: "People learn poorly from the past, and especially from other people's wars. In dictatorships, the right information often doesn't reach the top; there's quite a bit of literature on that. But Ukraine, of course, isn't necessarily the template for future wars."

The postwar world order was based on the idea that war had to be eradicated. Conflicts were supposed to be resolved through the UN. Not a bad idea, considering you apparently can't win a war anymore, right?

Kitzen: "A dictator like Putin chooses a major conflict. An authoritarian regime can have all sorts of reasons for waging war, including domestic ones. We can't afford to be incapable of countering that. To borrow the cliché: if you want peace, prepare for war."

Sweijs: "Your question implies that the use of military force is always aimed at completely defeating the opponent. And indeed: only one in five wars has a clear winner. But the paradigm 'war is politics by other means' also means that war can be a tool to inflict pain on your opponent, to achieve a political goal with limited force. In the Netherlands, we view war primarily from a legal and ethical perspective. But it's extremely important to also map out the other logics. That strategic thinking is completely lacking. Take 'hybrid war'. At first, it was pretended it didn't exist, then it was said: it's something on the sidelines, we're going back to the classic large-scale conflict. But if you look at Russian operations over the past five years, you see them change dramatically: from cyberattacks and disinformation to sabotage of vital infrastructure."

What do you do about that?

Sweijs: "We need to invest more in situational awareness , so we know what's happening – in terms of physical and cybersecurity, and therefore, yes, in the AIVD (General Intelligence and Security Service) and MIVD (Military Intelligence and Security Service). At the same time, we need to be much clearer with our opponents about what's absolutely unacceptable. Total deterrence in hybrid warfare isn't possible, but we can communicate more clearly: if you smuggle bomb packages onto a DHL flight, that's a casus belli for us."

How well prepared are we for a world where war is once again a real possibility?

Sweijs: "After thirty years of neglecting our defense, we need to catch up considerably, and that's happening now. But it's also about education. Not about teaching young people how military maneuvers are executed, but about teaching them that war is a reality for which you must prepare. We advocate for this in our book, and we also try to do so in our work at universities and in lectures. So you no longer have to go to Great Britain to study strategic engineering."

Kitzen: "I also want to emphasize the importance of diplomacy and development cooperation in preventing war. Russia and China are gaining considerable influence in fragile areas, such as Africa."

Military personnel we spoke with say: thanks to satellites, sensors, and advanced radar, nothing remains hidden from the enemy. Is it still possible to gain an advantage?

Sweijs: "As a small or medium-sized European power, we can never do what Russia does in Ukraine: continually throw new manpower at it to force a breakthrough. But you can invest relatively cheaply in millions of drones, sensors at all levels, air defense systems, and electronic warfare."

Kitzen: "It's about creating a local, temporary bubble where the enemy can't see and operate drones with impunity. Only then can you break the stalemate on the battlefield. A tremendous amount of research is currently being conducted on this. For example, on lasers to shoot drones out of the sky. At the end of World War I, the Germans used shock troops, small specialized units, to break the stalemate in the trenches. They almost succeeded during the Battle of the Kaiser in 1918. Ultimately, tanks and aircraft provided the breakthrough and the return of mobilization during World War II."

There's a huge amount of money available for defense now. Should we still invest it in expensive tanks that can be blown up with a drone costing a few thousand euros?

Sweijs: "There's a reason we rely on weapon systems like tanks, because they've proven their worth in the past. You can't simply dismiss them as outdated, but they do need to be able to survive on the battlefield, for example, through 'digital' camouflage."

Wouldn't it be smarter to set up drone units?

Sweijs: "Absolutely. You can create units where a few operators control a large number of drones, supplemented by robots and other unmanned systems, some of which are controlled by AI – within the framework of the laws of war."

Kitzen: "Everyone's struggling with that now. In Belgium, they've established a special drone battalion. But it might be better to distribute them among the regular units. During the First World War, separate machine gun regiments were first created, and then every unit received machine guns. I think it's dangerous to base our reasoning solely on old structures."