Naval Battles IV: 'Sammy B' and MacArthur's landing in the Philippines

At just 100 meters long and 12 meters wide, the destroyer USS Samuel B. Roberts , nicknamed " Sammy B " by its crew of just 224 men, was relatively small even by the standards of the Philippine Sea's typhoons. In reality, it was more of an escort of the John C. Butler class than a destroyer , which was nearly swallowed up by a completely unexpected storm before reaching the island of Samar, near the San Bernardino Strait.

Three days in which the ship “had listed so sharply—as much as fifty-nine degrees on the inclinometer—that, at terrifying intervals, it was easier to walk on the bulkheads separating the cabins than to stand on the deck.” It had been so terrible for the crew that when Second Class Seaman George Bray began seeing lightning and hearing a roar in the darkness a few days later, he feared another terrifying typhoon was about to hit. From his position, he could just make out Robert Copeland and shouted up:

"Hey, Captain, look at that storm!" "That's not a storm, son," Copeland said. "It's a battle. We're hearing it on the radio in here."

Lieutenant Commander Robert 'Bob' Copeland, commanding the Sammy B , had stepped off the bridge for a breath of fresh air, according to excerpts from memoirs, diaries, and letters collected by James D. Hornfischer in *The Last Stand of the Tin Can Soldiers *, a chronicle of the incredible story of the small flotilla Task Force 77.4, set against the backdrop of the massive naval operation that was the landing and Battle of Leyte Gulf – the largest single engagement at sea in history, fought by the U.S. and Japanese navies on October 24-25, 1945.

George Bray was almost more concerned about the Typhoon than the Japanese ships during his night watch, due to the secondary role played in the operation by the 7th Fleet Task Force nicknamed Taffy 3. Meanwhile, on the bridge, Bob Copeland closely followed what happened after the cipher workers decoded the radio messages arriving from the Surigao Strait some 220 km away, just opposite from them and where the great battle between the US and Japanese fleets was taking place at that moment.

The Sammy B was relatively safe with the rest of Taffy 3 in the San Bernardino Strait, named after Ruy López de Villalobos's expedition during the early explorations of the archipelago in the 16th century. This was because they were supported in their support of MacArthur's land landing by Admiral William F. Hasley's powerful 3rd Fleet, which boasted large battleships and cruisers, as well as first-class aircraft carriers two or three times their size, armament, and armor.

During the night, George Bray was almost more worried about the Typhoon than the Japanese ships.

By comparison, Taffy 3 was merely a flotilla consisting of three destroyers and four escort carriers, plus six escort carriers, and with no offensive weapons beyond its aircraft. It was the smallest element of the US naval force deployed on Leyte. But if the 100-meter length and 12-meter beam of the Sammy B or the 115 and 14 meters of the destroyer USS Johnston had seemed insufficient to weather the typhoon a few days before reaching Leyte, their armor and armament would prove even less so when a few hours later Admiral Kurita's fleet appeared, composed of four battleships—among them the giant Yamato —six armored cruisers, and two light cruisers.

And after the battle, the survivors would still have to defend themselves against the sharks, either by climbing into the battered lifeboats or directly from the sea surface. A story similar to the one told by Captain Quint in Jaws. (1977) about the sinking of the USS Indianapolis that occurred later in the same Philippine Sea.

No one expected Admiral Kurita at dawn on October 25, just hours after the 7th had annihilated the other Japanese fleet in the Surigao Strait, employing the 'Cross the T' maneuver pioneered by Japanese Admiral Tōgō at the 1905 Battle of Tsushima . So when the Taffy 3 flotilla spotted the large enemy fleet bearing down on them on radar and looked back, it turned out that Admiral William F. Hasley's large 3rd Fleet was not there.

At around 7:00 a.m., Lieutenant Commander Bob Copeland then addressed his crew : "A large Japanese fleet has been located. It is 15 miles away and heading in our direction. It is believed to number four battleships, eight cruisers, and several destroyers. This will be a fight against overwhelmingly superior forces, one that we cannot hope to survive. We will do as much damage as we can."

And on the USS Johnston , Captain Edward Evans also decided to attack with everything despite the enormous inferiority: “All personnel to battle stations! Prepare to attack the majority of the Japanese fleet. Full steam ahead ! Begin laying smoke screen and prepare for torpedo attack . Helm fully to port!”

In an era of large battleships and cruisers, aircraft carriers and submarines, the sacrifice of destroyers like the small Sammy B or the USS Johnston were crucial in stopping the Japanese fleet of Admiral Takeo Kurita , who incredibly managed to take by surprise the immense American squadron deployed around the island of Leyte, in the swarm of the Philippine Visayas islands. The small group of destroyers would have to sacrifice themselves against the Japanese superships.

Before the final confrontation, some doubts arose in the American command: was it necessary to land on the Philippine archipelago? Could the fleet have jumped directly to Formosa as the last obstacle in the Pacific to win the war? Now known as the Battle of Leyte Gulf, at the time it was called the Battle of the Philippines 24-26 October 1944, although as H.P. Wilmott points out in The Battle of Leyte Gulf. The last fleet action , the most accurate designation would have been the Naval Battle of the Philippines, to differentiate it in some way from the landing on Luzon Island later, in January 1945, which led to the Battle of Manila and the final liberation of the archipelago.

The scenario chosen to wage the decisive confrontation at sea had another war brewing in the offices of the US General Staff: that of Admiral Chester Nimitz against General Douglas MacArthur. The former was in command of the Pacific Fleet and the latter of the Southwest Pacific area . MacArthur advocated recovering the territory he had bitterly lost between April and May 1942 after six months of resistance on the Batán Peninsula and Corregidor Island in Manila Bay. Chester Nimitz's general staff, however, believed that the best way to definitively finish off Japan was to bypass the Philippines and continue on to Formosa —present-day Taiwan.

Admiral William F. Halsey himself favored the Philippines option when Nimitz appointed him head of the South Pacific and also suggested moving up the date. The idea was supported by MacArthur , who noted in his memoirs: “I was asked for my views on the proposal to change the date of the invasion of Leyte, and I cabled my approval of Halsey’s proposal. Thus, within ninety minutes after Quebec was consulted about the change of plans, we obtained permission to advance the date of our invasion of Leyte by two months,” –Douglas MacArthur, Reminiscences – .

Admiral William F. Halsey himself favored the Philippines option when Nimitz appointed him chief of the South Pacific and suggested moving up the date.

However, 'Bull' Halsey's role went beyond playing a key role in the sequence of events that would lead the Americans back to the Philippines. Just over a month after daring to propose a major change in Pacific strategy , he would find himself embroiled in a gigantic battle and one of the greatest naval controversies in history. Halsey would not be at his post to defend the San Bernardino Strait with his large ships of the 3rd Fleet under his command, because part of the Imperial Japanese Navy 's plan had been fulfilled as a result of his mistaken decision.

Although Tokyo knew they were going to lose the war as early as the summer of 1944, a series of plans called Sho-Go ( victory in Japanese ) had been prepared as a counterattack, the strategic value of which lay in inflicting so many losses on the US that negotiations could be forced. It was based on the bold idea of mobilizing virtually all available naval and air resources for each of the possible landing scenarios for US troops . Sho-Go 1 was the Philippines scenario, which the Japanese themselves considered the most likely; Sho-Go 2 was an attack on the Ryuku Islands and Formosa; Sho-Go 3 was Japan; and Sho-Go 4 was Hokkaido and the Curie Islands.

When Franklin D. Roosevelt decided to land on Leyte Island, the tactical development of the Sho-Go 1 plan was based on two elements: a pincer maneuver by two Japanese fleets on the American 7th, from the Surigao and San Bernardino Straits and another diversion that would draw away Hasley's 3rd Fleet, –which was protecting San Bernardino–, and where Taffy 3 was located. The most important thing is that the beachhead that General MacArthur had won after landing on Leyte on the 20th, making good on his promise “ I shall return !” –I will return !–, and posing for the photo with the water up to his knees, would be totally unprotected and with it the landing.

The Japanese plan , which involved putting everything on one card, used practically all of its naval force and depended on this maneuver and the decoy of the northern fleet, composed mainly of aircraft carriers, to be able to undo the enormous superiority of the United States.

On the night of October 25, the operation was executed and while the Japanese were destroyed in Surigao , Halsey ordered the 3rd Fleet to head north to attack the aircraft carriers designed as decoys by the Japanese, leaving the San Bernardino Strait unprotected at that moment.

Their movement allowed Takeo Kurita's powerful fleet, which included battleships such as the Yamato , to emerge by surprise and attack the Taffy 3 group, made up of escort aircraft carriers and light destroyers of the 7th Fleet: “Coordination was difficult because the 7th Fleet answered to MacArthur, and the 3rd Fleet to Nimitz,” says Thomas J. Cutler in The Battle of Leyte Gulf, 23-26 October 1944.

Halsey believed that the damage caused by an air attack the day before on Kurita's fleet had broken up the force that was set to advance on San Bernardino , and living up to his nickname "Bull," he charged headlong into the fray, chasing the Japanese aircraft carriers. Before that, he sent Thomas C. Kinkaid, commander of the 7th Fleet at Surigao, the most controversial message of the Pacific War : "Attack reports indicate that the enemy force [Kurita's force] has been severely damaged. I am proceeding north with three groups to attack the enemy carrier force at daybreak." As historian Thomas J. Cutler has analyzed, Kinkaid deduced that if Halsey was setting out with "three groups" and not "all three," there was probably a fourth group, and therefore he also failed to take into account that the Taffy 3 was left to its fate.

At 6:59, loaded with shells designed to penetrate heavy armor, the battleship Yamato 's powerful 18.1-inch guns turned to starboard and opened fire on Taffy 3 at a range of nearly twenty miles. A minute later, Kurita issued a general attack order to the entire fleet.

The Yamato remains the largest battleship that ever existed, but no less powerful were the Kongo or the Nagato , facing three destroyers and four escorts whose hulls were split in half by Japanese shells without even exploding. The greatest strength that Taffy 3 had was the aircraft of its escort carriers, and their determination to give battle and sacrifice every last ship to try to somehow confuse Kurita.

The greatest strength that the 'Taffy 3' had was the aircraft of its escort carriers, and its determination to give battle and sacrifice itself.

The destroyers had little artillery that could make a dent in the Japanese ships, but their ferocious attack and the confusion they created with their smoke bombs turned the strait into chaos, gaining some advantage before the escort carriers' aircraft could engage . However, this was not an aircraft designed for naval attack, but rather as a support force for General MacArthur's ground operations. Even so, they managed to sink three Japanese heavy cruisers.

For two hours, the small destroyers of Taffy 3 made all the noise they could to delay the Japanese advance, to the point that Admiral Kurita, in an inexplicable error, comparable only to that of William Hasley a few hours earlier, decided to withdraw when the small flotilla was practically annihilated.

The Sammy B, the Johnston and the Hoel were sunk, while the other three escort destroyers and the badly damaged Heerman miraculously survived as the Japanese concentrated fire on the carriers, sinking two before withdrawing. Taffy 3 's sacrifice would prove absolutely crucial in securing the landing.

The Sammy B lost 90 men out of a crew of 224, the Johnston had 186 out of a crew of 327, and the Hoel 253 men out of 329 while the sunken carriers the Gambier Bay and the St. Lo recorded hundreds of dead and missing. Second Class Seaman George Bray and Captain Robert 'Bob' Copeland survived the sinking of the small destroyer Sammy B, Ernst Evans went down instead with the USS Johnston.

Boarding lifeboats with other survivors of the battle, Bray and Copeland had yet another attack to dodge: sharks in the Philippine Sea. Glistening in the sea, bathed in a thick mixture of diesel fuel and blood, many died from their wounds and others from the shark attacks , but the Japanese navy would no longer pose a threat.